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STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW: THEORIES OF RECOVERY
INTRODUCTION
A person suffering personal injury or property damage attributable
to a defective product may sue on three grounds: negligence, breach of
warranty or strict tort liability.' Each remedy brings to product litigation
a unique history, policy and set of rules. Recovery based on these theories
is available in product cases in all but a few jurisdictions.
2
This section will discuss the evolution of the three theories of recovery
in the United States, paying particular attention to recent trends that may
shape future changes in the three theories. The section will concentrate
on strict liability, the most stringent of the three theories. Because it
requires no showing of fault, strict liability has been attacked vigorously
by critics as being unfairly weighted in favor of the plaintiff. The section
will examine several recent state statutes aimed at limiting the applicability
of strict liability. The legislative inertia necessary to pass these provisions
has come from those who argue that an overly generous system has
created a national crisis in which manufacturers and retailers can no
longer obtain adequate liability insurance.
NEGLIGENCE
Every state affords recovery in product cases based on negligence
principles.3 In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the
manufacturer marketed an unreasonably dangerous product, that the
product proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries and that the defect
existed while the defendant still had control of the product. 4 The negligence
theory focuses upon the conduct of the manufacturer and places the
burden on the plaintiff to establish that the manufacturer failed to act
reasonably in producing and marketing the product.5
The negligence of the manufacurer is often difficult for the plaintiff
to prove in product actions. As a practical matter, the manufacturer often
controls the evidence of its negligent conduct, which renders it inaccessible
1. An extensive review of these doctrines is beyond the scope of this note. For a more complete
discussion, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971).
2. Negligence is a recognized basis of recovery in product injury actions in every jurisdiction. See
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability For Products, 44 Miss. L. REv. 825, 825-26 (1973).
Breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code is an additional basis of recovery in
all jurisdictions but Louisiana. See [19861 1 PROD. LIA. REP. (CCH) 1023. Finally, strict tort
liability is recognized as a basis of recovery in forty-six jurisdictions, including Puerto Rico. See
[1986] 1 PROD. LLa. REP. (CCH) 4026-27. For a discussion of states rejecting strict liablity
in tort, see infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
3. See Wade, supra note 2, at 825-26.
4. See W. Prosser, supra note 1, at 643.
5. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRMDMAN, PRODUCT LIABnLITY, § 3.01[1], 3-4 (1986).
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to the plaintiff. 6 Even when the evidence is available, it is often too
complicated or technical for the plaintiff to understand and use in his or
her case.7 Consequently, the plaintiff may be precluded from recovering
in a negligence-based product action. This problem has compelled most
product liability plaintiffs to rely upon the more liberal theories of implied
warranty and strict liability in tort as grounds for recovery.
BREACH OF WARRANTY
With the exception of Louisiana, all states allow recovery in product
cases based on breach of warranty.8 This theory of recovery is based on
the seller's expressed or implied representations to the buyer or user of
the product. When the seller reveals to the buyer the particular purpose
for which the product is to be used, there arises an implied warranty that
the product purchased is reasonably fit for that purpose. 9 An implied
warranty is also created when the seller represents the product as reason-
ably fit for the general purpose for which it was manufactured. 10
Liability in warranty arises where damages are caused by a failure of
the product to conform with such representations made by the seller. The
focus in warranty actions, therefore, is the condition of the product, not
the fault of the seller. Recovery in warranty is not limited to immediate
buyers. The traditional rule of privity, which requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate a contractual relatedness to the seller of the product, has
steadily eroded in the product liability context." Consequently, remotely
situated plaintiffs now have many avenues through which to recover
against sellers. The Uniform Commercial Code clarifies the remaining
6. See Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 621, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (1942); Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadels (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114
(1960).
7. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("[tihe consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a sealed package").
See also Keeton, Product Liability-Problems Related to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26
(1965).
8. [1986] 1 PROD. LtAB. REP. (CCH) 1020, 1023.
9. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977) (an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises if the
buyer relies upon the seller's representation of safety and adequacy and the seller guarantees
that the product is appropriate for the use the consumer contemplates).
10. Id. § 2-314 (an implied warranty of merchantability arises when the seller guarantees that the
product is of merchantable quality).
11. [1986] 1 PROD. LIB. REP. (CCH) 1190, at 1121. The leading warranty decision abrogating
the privity of contract rule was Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held the manufacturer of an automobile
and the dealer liable for injuries to a passenger in the car, based upon an implied warranty of
safety to foreseeable users. Within a few years of this decision, courts in the vast majority of
states followed New Jersey's lead and recognized the existence of implied warranties made
directly to the users and consumers of assorted products. See 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCT LBILITY § 6.102, at 6-74-76; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 654-55. For a discussion
of the development of the privity rule prior to the Henningsen decision, see Prosser, supra note
6, at 654-55; Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L.
REV. 963 (1957).
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requirements of privity in actions by third parties against sellers and
extends the buyer's warranty to family, household members and guests.1
2
Nonetheless, several obstacles still stand in the way of recovery under
the warranty provisions of the U.C.C. First, a plaintiff may be barred
from recovery in a product action based upon implied warranty if he or
she does not first notify the seller of the breach within a reasonable
time."3 A plaintiff may also be barred from recovery if the seller of the
defective product excludes or modifies the implied warranty. 4 Finally, a
plaintiff relying upon a U.C.C. remedy will be barred from recovery if
unable to show that he or she falls within the class of persons protected
by implied warranty. 5 Consequently, recovery based upon the warranty
provisions of the U.C.C. is more restrictive than recovery based upon
strict liability in tort. 6
STRICT TORT LIABILITY
Unlike a negligence action, which is based on the conduct of the
defendant, or a warranty action, which is based on the seller's represen-
tations to buyers or users, a strict liability action is based on the quality
of the product. 7 The most common expression of the doctrine of strict
liability is provided by Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 8 which states that a defendant may be found liable if it sells a
12. U.C.C. § 2-318 expresses three alternative rules relating to privity. Alternative A states that
warranties extend from seller to "any natural person who is in the family or the household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty."
Alternative B provides that warranties extend from seller to "any natural person who may
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods .. " Alternative C states
that warranties extend from seller to "any person who may reasonably be expected to use,
consume or be affected by the goods .. " Twenty-nine jurisdictions have adopted some form
of alternative A, six jurisdictions have adopted alternative B, and seven jurisdictions have
adopted alternative C. In addition, five states completely abolished the privity requirement.
[1984] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4017, at 4029-30.
13. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1977). As Prosser notes, § 2-607(3)(a) often becomes "a booby-trap for
the unwary" when applied to personal injury plaintiffs who purchase products from remote
sellers. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 655. Nonetheless, many courts are more liberal when
applying this section to individual purchasers than when applying it to commercial purchasers.
See 2A L. FRUMER & M. FsuEDMAN, supra note 5, at § 6.14[2], at 6-181-88. See also, U.C.C.
§ 2-607(3)(a), official comment 4 (1977).
14. The nonmanufacturer seller may be able to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability by
simply informing the buyer that the warranty is excluded, or by stating that the product is being
sold "as is" or "with all faults." U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a). Nonetheless, many courts have disallowed
liberal use of disclaimers and have held that disclaimer of warranty clauses as applied to
individual consumers is unconscionable and against public policy. Moreover, the U.C.C. provides
that a limitation or exclusion of consequential damages is prima facie unconscionable when
applied to product-related injuries to consumers. Id at § 2-719(3).
15. Id. at § 2-318. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternative provisions
of § 2-318.
16. Although privity, reliance and notice remain necessary elements in most breach of warranty
actions, such restrictions are not relevant in strict tort liability actions.
17. [1984] 1 PROD. LsAB. REP. (CCH) 4000, 4005.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer."' 9 To recover under the Restatement version of strict liability,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the seller is engaged in the business
of selling the product, and that the product was expected to and did reach
the plaintiff in substantially the same condition as it was when sold.20
Accordingly, the strict liability doctrine imposes liability without fault by
relieving the plaintiff of the burden of proving the negligent conduct of
the manufacturer.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Product, Inc.21 was one of the the first
decisions to discuss the rationales for applying strict liability. In Greenman,
Chief Justice Traynor explained that the policy behind strict liability Is
to require manufacturers to bear the cost of injuries caused by their
defective products." Furthermore, an important basis of strict liablity is
the notion that the cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person
injured, but the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed to the public as a cost of doing business.
23
After the Greenman decision in 1963 and the adoption of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1964,2 almost every state
followed these leads and applied strict liability principles to product cases .2S
The rapid acceptance of strict liability can be seen as a judicial response
to significant changes in marketing practices. Improvements in transpor-
tation and advances in technology have enabled interstate corporations to
offer an array of new products to consumers throughout the country.
The complexity of interstate manufacturing processes and marketing se-
crecy has rendered it nearly impossible for an injured plaintiff to prove
a manufacturer's carelessness in marketing such a product. 26 Moreover, it
it is now assumed that the manufacturer should anticipate many hazards
and guard against their occurrence. 27
19.
20. Id.
21. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
22. 377 P.2d at 900.
23. 377 P.2d at 901.
24. 41 ALl PROCEEDINGS 375 (1964-1965). The institute did not publish its final version of § 402A
until 1965. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
25. 1 R. HUEsH & H. BAILEY, AMERIcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LiABlrrY §§ 4:11-12 (2d ed. 1974).
26. See, e.g., Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc., 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965) (the
consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing techniques and trademarks);
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring);
Santor v. A. & M. Karaheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (the consumer does not
have the ability to investigate for himself the soundness of the product).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
For a discussion of other common public policy justifications for the application of strict
liability see generally PROSSER, supra note 6; PROSSER, The Fall of the Citadels (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). For a critique of these policies supporting the
adoption of strict liability, see EPSTEIN, Products Liability: The Search for a Middle Ground,
56 N.C.L. REV. 3, (1978); OWENS, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Product Liability, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 681, (1981).
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Most states using strict product liability theory have adopted the
Restatement version of strict liability, imposing liability on sellers only
for defects in manufacturing and design that render the product unrea-
sonably dangerous to one's person or property. 28 A product is deemed
"unreasonably dangerous" for the purpose of determining defectiveness
when the finder of fact holds that it is dangerous to an extent beyond
that contemplated by an ordinary purchaser.
29
Some strict liability states, including New York, Pennsylvania and
California, have rejected the unreasonable dangerousness requirement.
These states argue that proof of unreasonable dangerousness relies upon
discarded negligence principles that may confuse and mislead a jury.30
They also argue that the requirement bears little relation to the defective-
ness of a product.3' These states instead have fashioned forms of strict
liability absent the unreasonable dangerousness requirement.3 2 New York
courts recently discarded the term "unreasonable dangerousness" and
replaced it with "not unreasonably safe" as the standard to apply in
determining whether a product is defectively designed at the time of
manufacture. 3 This "not reasonably safe" standard has also been adopted
in Washington.
3 4
Pennsylvania's standard for determining defectiveness is whether the
product is "safe for its intended use." 3 Product defectiveness is found
in Ohio, on the other hand, with either proof that the product is not safe
for its intended use or that the dangerousness of the product outweighs
its intended benefit.36 Despite the proliferation of strict tort liability in
28. [1986] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4016, 4026-27.
29. This standard is derived from the meaning of unreasonable dangerousness: "The article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). For an extensive
discussion of states' adoption of comment i of Section 402A, see J. BEASLEY, PRODUCT LiABiLrry
AND THa UNREASONABLE DANGEROUSNESS REQUIREMENT 167-211 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Mattock v. Daylin, Inc., 611 F.2d 30 (1979) (inclusion of the words "unreasonable
dangerousness" in special verdict interrogatories was error requiring new trial); Azzarello v.
Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (repeated use of the term
"unreasonable dangerousness" in instructions to jury necessitated new trial).
31. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (the
term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" has a connotation contrary to the purpose
of strict liability, which was developed to relieve consumers from proving the more difficult
elements of negligence). See also Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pentz, 595 F.2d 1760 (3d
Cir. 1979); Foglio v. Western Auto Supply, 50 Cal. App. 3d 470 (1976).
32. Although it has expressly rejected the requirement of unreasonable dangerousness, the Supreme
Court of California has adopted a test for measuring defectiveness in design defect cases that
at least partially replicates the "consumer expectation" test of section 402A comment i. See
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
33. See Voss v. Black and Decker Mfg., Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 463 N.Y.S. 398 (1983).
34. See Kimble v. Waste Systems International, Inc., 23 Wash. App. 331, 595 P.2d 569 (1979);
Seattle National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
35. See Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (a standard
suggesting the existence of a defect in the article is unreasonably dangerous or not duly safe is
inadequate to guide a jury in determining liability).
36. See Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1984) (the defectiveness
of a product must be measured by both the consumer expectation test and risk/benefit analysis).
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product liability actions, a few states have been unwilling to adopt this
doctrine in any form as a basis of recovery. Some jurisdictions instead
embrace one form or another of strict liability based in warranty theory,
as is the case in Michigan, 37 where it has been judicially adopted, and
Massachusetts,3" where it has been statutorily adopted. Michigan courts
refuse to accept strict liablity in tort, noting that strict warranty liability
offers sufficient protection for injured parties.39 Similarly, Massachusetts
courts refuse to accept strict liability in tort, arguing that an action based
on the state warranty provisions afford plaintiffs better protection. 40
Delaware, 41 North Carolina42 and Virginia43 also have refused to accept
strict tort liability but have not made any corresponding changes in the
state warranty provisions to liberalize the basis for recovery.
Liability of Nonmanufacturers
The explosive growth of product liability actions in the last twenty-
five years has not been restricted to suits against manufacturers. Virtually
every state allows product liability plaintiffs to recover against wholesalers,
retailers and other participants in the product distribution chain. Most
jurisdictions hold these nonmanufacturers to the same degree of liability
as the manufacturers of defective products. 44 The same standards of
liability apply to all classes of sellers primarily because neither Section
402A nor the Uniform Commercial Code draw a distinction between
manufacturers and nonmanufacturers. 45 The rapid and widespread adop-
37. See Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (an innocent
bystander who is injured by a defective product has an action against the manufacturer of the
product based on breach of warranty theory, though there is no privity between the bystander
and manufacturer).
38. The Massachusetts Legislature has embraced the concept of strict liability in warranty by
eliminating the privity of contract, disclaimer of liability and notice of injury for warranty
actions involving sales. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1978).
39. 133 N.W.2d 129.
40. Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61 (Mass. 1978) (driver whose car plowed through
a house and caused injury could not sue the manufacturer of the car on the basis of strict
liability).
41. Wilhelm v. Globe Solvent Co., 373 A.2d 218 (Del. Super. 1977) (warranty provision of the
U.C.C., rather than strict liability, governs product liability actions involving the sale of goods).
See also Cline v. Prowler Industry of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 1030 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1980).
42. Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981) (strict liability is available
only to dangerous instrumentalities, such as dynamite, and is therefore not available to claimant
who was injured by an exploding camera flashcube).
43. [1986] 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4015, at 4025.
44. 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCT LIuABIrrY, § 6.01[2] (1986).
45. The Restatement applies to "any persons engaged in the business of selling goods for use or
consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, [and] to any wholesaler
or retail dealer or distributor." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965).
The warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code apply to sellers. U.C.C. §2-
314(1). Because the Code broadly defines a seller as "a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods," U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(d), the warranty provision likely will apply to nonmanufacturer
product sellers.
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tion of the Restatement and U.C.C. created a broad class of potentially
liable defendants in product liability actions."
Many states recently have sought to limit the liability of sellers,
distributors and retailers. Legislation enacted for this purpose includes
statutes of repose and indemnification statutes. 47 Another common type
of statute enacted for this purpose has been nonmanufacturer protection
statutes, which are specifically designed to limit the liability of nonman-
ufacturer sellers in product actions. 4 Generally, these statutes shift the
liability from the distributor or retailer to the manufacturer directly
responsible for the product defects. The immunity provided the nonman-
ufacturer, however, has been narrowly tailored by state legislatures in
several ways. First, the statutes prohibit recovery from nonmanufacturers
based upon strict liability in tort, but they do not prohibit recovery based
upon negligence or breach of implied warranty. 49 For example, the Ne-
braska product liability statute simply bars any actions based on strict
tort liability against any seller or lessor of either a defective or unreason-
ably dangerous product unless the seller/lessor is the manufacturer of the
product.5 0 Similar stautes have been enacted in Colorado," Minnesota
5 2
and Illinois. 3
46. Courts have developed a number of rationales to justify the extension of liability to a broad
class of sellers. The first case holding a nonmanufacturer strictly liable in a product liability
action was Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964). Holding that the retailer of a defective product, as well as the manufacturer, was strictly
liable for an injury caused by a defect, the California Supreme Court reasoned that "[sltrict
liability of the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured
plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendant, for they can adjust the cost of such protection
between them in the course of their continuous relationship." 391 P.2d at 172.
For a discussion of other rationales offered by courts for extending strict liability to non-
manufacturers in product cases, see Leete, Caught in the Middle: The Need for Uniformity in
Product Liability Statutes Affecting Nonmanufacturer Sellers, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 997,
1004-05 (1982).
47. These statutes protect nonmanufacturer sellers from liability by providing them with an indemnity
cause of action against manufacturers of the defective products. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-684 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2806 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-6 (Burns
1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-07 (Supp.1985).
48. See COLO. RaV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE. § 6-1407 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 2-621 (Smith-Hurd 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.3306 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 411.340 (Bobbs-Merrill 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (1984); NEB. Rav. STAT. §
25-21,181 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (1985); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.33 (Page
Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (West
Supp. 1987).
49. One commentator has argued that by excluding recovery on the basis of strict liability but not
on the basis of breach of warranty, these statutes undermine their own purpose of protecting
nonmanufacturers in product actions. See Leete, supra note 46, at 1010-13.
MB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 181 (1985).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (1) (Supp. 1987). The Colorado statute, however, includes a
broader definition of manufacturer that includes (1) any seller who had knowledge of the defect,
(2) furnishes specifications for the product, (3) exercises significant control over the manufac-
turing process, or (4) alters or modifies the product in any significant manner. Id. By so defining
manufacturers, Colorado allows plaintiffs to recover from a broader class of possible defendants
than is available in other states.
52. MnNr'. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1984).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8021 (Smith-Hurd 1984).
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A few states further restrict the protection of nonmanufacturers by
carefully enumerating the circumstances under which this protection is
available. Statutes enacted in Tennessee 4 and North Carolina" are note-
worthy in this respect. The Tennessee statute provides that a seller cannot
be liable in strict tort liability if the defective product was sold in a sealed
container, or if the seller had no reasonable opportunity to inspect the
product and discover its defective condition.56 Although differently worded,
the purpose of North Carolina's 1979 statutory provision57 is identical to
the Tennessee law. Similarly, the Kentucky Product Liability Act permits
a wholesaler, distributor or retailer to escape liability if, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the seller establishes that the product was sold in
its original condition or package.5" These statutes eliminate the duty of
nonmanufacturers to inspect closed packages but do not eliminate possible
liability for failing to inspect products not sold in packages.
The 1980 Idaho Product Liability Reform Act, like the Tennessee
and North Carolina statutes, protects nonmanufacturer sellers from lia-
bility where they had no reasonable opportunity to inspect the product
for defects.59 Idaho's statute, however, withholds this protection from
sellers who are directly involved in the production or marketing of allegedly
defective products. Thus, a seller may be held liable to a plaintiff if (1)
the seller alters or modifies the product without authority or direction
from the manufacturer, (2) the seller provides plans or specifications that
caused the plaintiff's injury, (3) the seller either is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the manufacturer or wholly owns the manufacturer, or (4)
the seller sold the product after its expiration date. 60
Finally, nonmanufacturer protection statutes almost universally with-
hold protection to wholesalers, distributors and retailers when the plaintiff
is unable to recover from the manufacturer. Thus, when the manufacturer
of an allegedly defective product is not subject to service of process in
the state, all statutes but one6' allow a plaihtiff to recover from a
nonmanufacturer in an unrestricted action. 62 Provisions of this nature are
based on the rationale that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for his
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1983).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2 (1985).
56. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106(a) (1983).
57. N.C. STAT. § 99B-2(a).
58. Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.340 (Bobbs-Merrill 1986).
59. IDAHo ACTS § 6-1307 (1) (Supp. 1986). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-9 (1979).
60. IDAHO ACTS § 6-1307 (1) (Supp. 1986).
61. In order to recover in a product action, a plaintiff who is unable to obtain jurisdiction over
the manufacturer in Nebraska must establish the seller's negligence or breach of warranty or
sue in a jurisdiction where the manufacturer can be found. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 181 (1985).
62. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (4)(a) (Supp. 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 802(c) (Smith-Hurd 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.3306 (1983); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Bobbs-Merrill 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (b)(c) (West 1984);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(a) (1985); Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.33 (b)(4) (Page Supp. 1986);
TENN. CODE ANN. §29-28-106(a) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040 (2)(a) (West Supp.
1987). These state provisions are generally uniform with only minor variations in language.
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injuries, even when the manufacturer cannot be brought into court.
Although some states protect nonmanufacturers whenever jurisdiction
can be obtained over the manufacturer, 63 several states also permit plain-
tiffs to recover from a nonmanufacturer when it is judicially determined
that the manufacturer is insolvent. 6' Product liability statutes in Idaho
and Kansas also allow recovery from a nonmanufacturer if a court
determines it is unlikely that the plaintiff will be able to enforce a judgment
against the manufacturer. 6 By providing these exceptions to the protection
provided nonmanufacturer sellers, these statutes ensure that plaintiffs will
have a responsible party from whom they can recover.
CONCLUSION
With their rapid acceptance of strict liability theory during the 1960s,
states greatly improved the odds that injured plaintiffs will receive com-
pensation for their injuries. In recent years, however, states have experi-
mented with various alterations to pure strict liability theory. One of the
major forces behind such modifications has been the debate about whether
the tort system has gotten out of hand and created a liability monster.
In time, application of the strict liability modifications discussed in
this section may help develop a tort system that is fairer than the present
system to plaintiffs and defendants. In the meantime, the only certainty
is that further experimentation will take place.
Donald E. Stuby*
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402(2) (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-621 (Smith-Hurd
1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Baldwin 1986).
64. IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (4)(b) (Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.41 (West 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 99B-2 (1985); OhIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.33 (B)(2)(6) (Page Supp. 1986); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-106(A)(1), (A)(2) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.040(2)(a) (West
Supp. 1987).
For a discussion of the various procedures states set forth for determining the insolvency of
manufacturers, see Leete, supra note 46, at 1021-23.
65. Compare IDAHO CODE § 6-1407 (4)(b) ("[t]he court outside the presence of the jury determines
that it is highly probable that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the
product manufacturer") with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.3306 ("any judgment against the manufac-
turer obtained . . . would be reasonably certain of being satisfied").
* B.A., Michigan State University, 1985; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1988.
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